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Abstract Despite the fact that a substantial body of European Community (EC) law
already exists to protect retail investors, the markets in retail investment services and
products in the EU remain fragmented. Moreover, the recent financial crisis has undermined
investor confidence in financial markets more generally, and “packaged” retail investment
products (PRIP), such as investment funds or life insurance policies, in particular. To
rebuild retail investor confidence in PRIP by empowering retail investors to make active
use of their rights, in 2009 the European Commission proposed to extend the provisions of
the 2004 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) to PRIP. Is the MiFID,
however, fit for the purpose which the Commission has in mind? This contribution explores
to what extent the MiFID actually confers rights on retail investors and empowers them to
make use of these rights. The author concludes that investor rights and remedies should be
taken more seriously when making European financial services law. The current overhaul of
the EC legal framework for the provision of investment services provides a good
opportunity to do so.
Keywords EC securities regulation . Retail investment services . Investor protection .
Investor rights . MiFID
Introduction
Financial services, in particular investment services, have become an essential part of the
everyday life of EU citizens. Such services facilitate citizens’ full participation in the
economy, enabling them to plan for the long term and protecting them from unforeseen
changes in circumstances. Financial services are also of great significance for the EU
economy. A single market in financial services, which has been the overall EU objective in
the last decade, would “act as a catalyst for economic growth across all sectors of the
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economy, boost productivity, and provide lower cost and better quality financial products
for consumers and enterprises.”1 The growing economic importance of financial services is
reflected in a great number of regulatory initiatives that have been undertaken in this area
by the EU in the last decade. Whereas initially the EU focused mainly on regulating the
wholesale financial market,2 in recent years the emphasis in the EU policy has shifted
considerably towards the integration of retail (consumer) financial markets.3
One of the areas where European integration has been actively sought is the market for
retail investment services. Such services involve the supply of financial instruments (such as
shares or bonds) or investment products (such as investment insurance), and services (such
as investment advice), by one party (an investment service provider, such as an investment
firm or a credit institution) to another party (a client, i.e., a retail investor (consumer)).
At present, retail investment services are subject to a number of both cross-sectoral and
sector-specific measures (to be) adopted by the European Community with a view to
protecting consumers. Recent cross-sectoral European Community (EC) measures of a
more general character include the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services
Directive,4 the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive,5 and the proposal for a Consumer
Rights Directive.6 These horizontal instruments contain rules targeting inter alia misleading
and aggressive commercial practices and the use of unfair standard contract terms in the
whole financial sector and beyond, which should also be observed by investment service
providers.7 Yet, the main body of rules governing the provision of investment services,
including investor protection rules, is currently contained in the sector-specific legislation.
The regulation of investment services in general is dominated by the Markets in Financial
1 Conclusion of a discussion among economy and finance ministers, the ECB president and governors of
National Central Banks, at the informal ECOFIN meeting in Brussels in April 2002, in a report on financial
integration drawn up by a Working Group of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC).
2 Financial Service Action Plan 1999–2005 (FSAP). Documents relating to the FSAP can be found at <http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/actionplan/index_en.htm#documents>.
3 White Paper on Financial Services 2005–2010, COM (2005) 629; Green Paper on Retail Financial
Services, COM (2007) 226; Initiatives in the Area of Retail Financial Services: Accompanying Document to
the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (COM, 2007) 724 final; Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
European Central Bank on Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth, COM (2010) 301 final, pp.
6–7. See also the recent speeches by the new EU Commissioner for the internal market and services Michel
Barnier, in particular, “Forging a New Deal between Finance and Society: Restoring Trust in the Financial
Sector” at the European Financial Services Conference, Brussels, 26 April 2010 and “A New Ambition for
the European Market” at the European Parliament’s Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee,
Brussels, 28 April 2010.
4 Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 concerning the
distance marketing of consumer financial services and amending Council Directive 90/619/EEC and
Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC, OJ L 271/16.
5 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/
EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 149/22.
6 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights COM (2008)
614. The proposal is the result of the review of the Consumer Acquis which covers four directives on
consumer protection: Directive 85/577/EEC on contracts negotiated away from business premises, Directive
93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, Directive 97/7/EC on distance contracts, Directive 1999/
44/EC on consumer sales and guarantees.
7 The Draft Directive on Consumer Rights is applicable to contracts relating to financial services only in so
far as they are not covered by the existing Community legislation on consumer financial services (Recital
11). For the purposes of the Draft Directive, a “financial service means any service of a banking, credit,
insurance, personal pension, investment or payment nature” (art. 2 (13)).
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Instruments Directive (MiFID),8 which has been described as Europe’s “new constitution”
in the area of investment services and secondary capital markets (Grundamann and
Hollering 2008, pp. 58–59).9
Despite the fact that a substantial body of EC law already exists to protect retail
investors, the markets in retail investment services and products in the EU remain
fragmented.10 On the one hand, investment firms and credit institutions are reluctant to
engage in cross-border retail investment services. On the other hand, consumers are
reluctant to buy investment services and products abroad. Moreover, the recent financial
crisis has undermined investor confidence in financial products and markets more generally.
While retail investment in the financial markets is currently largely channeled through
“packaged” retail investment products (PRIP), such as investment funds or life insurance
policies, assets invested in such products have declined from 10 trillion € at the end of 2007
to estimates of around 8€ at the end of 2008.11
According to the European Commission, “[t]he financial crisis has provided a stark reminder
of the importance of transparency in financial products and of the potential costs of
irresponsible selling. A collapse in investor confidence has underlined the urgency of ensuring
the right regulatory framework is in place, so that the rebuilding of confidence can occur on a
sound basis.”12 To rebuild retail investor confidence in PRIP, in 2009 the Commission
launched the review of the EC investor protection measures currently in place.13 The
Commission’s view is that the existing legal requirements on product transparency, sales and
advice differ according to the legal form investment products take and the channel through
which they are sold; moreover, some products and distribution channels are not currently
addressed by EC law at all. Consequently, the legal framework for investment services
currently in place does not provide “a coherent basis for the protection of the retail investor or
for the balanced development of the market for packaged retail investment products.”14
In the words of Emil Paulis, Director of the Financial Services Policy and Financial
Markets Directorate, the main purpose of the overhaul of the current EC investor protection
measures can be seen as “empowering investors to make adequate use of their rights.”15 To
8 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in
financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, OJ L 145/1. See
also Directive 2006/73/EC of the EC Commission of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council as regards organizational and operating conditions for
investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive, OJ L 241/26.
9 Primary markets are involved in bringing securities to the market for the first time and transactions between
the issuer seeking capital and the investor providing capital. Secondary markets involve all transactions in
securities which take place after their issue, or after the initial distribution. Both the stock exchange market
and the markets outside the stock exchanges are considered to belong to the secondary markets in securities.
10 Green Paper on Retail Financial Services, COM (2007) 226.
11 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Packaged Retail
Investment Products, COM (2009) 204 final, p. 2 (referred to below as Commission Communication on
PRIP).
12 Commission Communication on PRIP, p. 2.
13 Commission Communication on PRIP. The Commission’s intention to present legislative proposals on
packaged retail investment products has recently been confirmed in the Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and
the European Central Bank on Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth, COM (2010) 301 final,
p. 7.
14 Commission Communication on PRIP, p. 2.
15 Summary of the Technical Workshop on Packaged Retail Investment Products, 22 October 2009, available
at <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/investment_products/minutes-prips-workshop-
221009_en.pdf>, p. 2 (italics added).
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empower retail investors to do so, the Commission proposes to replace the existing sectoral
patchwork by a horizontal cross-cutting approach to mandatory disclosures and selling
practices, so that the same legislative requirements would apply to all sales of PRIP,
irrespective of the distribution channel employed. In the view of the Commission, the
MiFID provisions on conduct of business rules “offer a clear benchmark for such
requirements.”16
Against this background, the question which will be addressed in this contribution is to
what extent the MiFID provisions on conduct of business rules, which the European
Commission proposes to extend to all PRIP, actually confer rights on retail investors and
empower them to make use of these rights. For this purpose, I will first discuss the purport
of the conduct of business rules regime laid down by the MiFID. Subsequently, I will turn
to the analysis of the implications of this regime for the empowerment of retail investors
(“The Implications of the MiFID Conduct of Business Regime for Retail Investor
Empowerment”) and the role of general private law in protecting such investors (“The
Role of Private Law in Protecting Retail Investors”). I will conclude by stressing the need
to take retail investor rights more seriously when making European financial services law
(“Concluding Remarks”).
The Purport of the MiFID Conduct of Business Regime
Contract-Related Conduct of Business Rules
One of the important aspects of the MiFID is the introduction of an extensive catalogue of
substantive requirements—the so-called “conduct of business rules”—governing the
provision of investment services to their recipients at the pre-contractual and contractual
stages. Apart from the overall objective of the market integration, the conduct of business
regime has the twofold aim of ensuring a high level of investor protection and the integrity
and overall efficiency of the financial system.
The MiFID conduct of business rules build upon the broadly formulated principles laid
down by art. 11 of its predecessor—the Investment Services Directive (ISD)17: the loyalty
principle (any investment service provider must act honestly and fairly in the best interests
of its (potential) clients), the informed consent principle (the investment service provider
must adequately disclose relevant material information when dealing with its (potential)
clients), and the “know your client” principle (the investment service provider must seek
from its (potential) clients information regarding their financial situation, investment
experience and objectives as regards the services requested).
Articles 18–24 of the MiFID considerably clarify and supplement these principles. The
core of the conduct of business rules under the MiFID is formed by the general duty of
loyalty; the duty to provide clear, fair, and not misleading information; various disclosure
obligations, in particular concerning the risks involved in a particular investment service or
product and concerning the conflict of interests; the duty to know one’s client and to ensure
the “appropriateness” or “suitability” of an investment service, financial instrument, or
investment product to one’s client; the duty to ensure “best execution” of the client’s order.18
16 Commission Communication on PRIP, p. 10.
17 Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field, OJ L 141/27.
18 The meaning of these rules is further fleshed out in arts. 21, 22, 24, 26–50 of the Directive 2006/73/EC
implementing the MiFID.
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The extent to which the conduct of business rules are applicable depends on the
nature of a (potential) client. The MiFID requires Member States to oblige investment
service providers to classify their (potential) clients into three categories: professional
clients, retail clients, and eligible counterparties.19 Professional clients are institutional
investors, such as credit institutions, investment firms or pension funds, which are
required to be authorized or regulated to operate in the financial markets. Retail
clients are all those clients which do not fall under the category of professional
clients. Finally, eligible counterparties are clients who may be treated as professional
by the investment service provider on request and may thus waive certain protections
afforded by the conduct of business rules. It is worth noting that under the MiFID
retail investors may also be treated as professional clients provided that they meet
certain requirements concerning the expertise, experience, and knowledge in the
investment field.20 Apart from this limited category of retail investors who may waive
certain protections, investment service providers should normally observe the conduct
of business rules in their dealings with retail investors, if necessary against the will of
such investors.
Maximum Harmonization of Conduct of Business Rules
Initially the EC pursued only a minimum harmonization of the conduct of business rules in
Europe. Under the 1993 ISD Member States were allowed to exceed the level of investor
protection envisaged in this Directive. Moreover, due to the fact that the principles of
business conduct introduced by art. 11 of the ISD operated on a high level of generality, the
level of harmonization induced thereby was quite modest, as different rules could be
perfectly compatible with these broad principles.21
In contrast to its predecessor, however, the MiFID generally aims to bring about a
maximum harmonization of the rules concerning investment services and activities in
the securities field, including the conduct of business rules. Member States are
allowed to retain or impose requirements additional to those in this Directive only in
exceptional cases.22 While some detailed provisions on conduct of business rules, in
particular the duty to know one’s client when providing execution-only services, are
19 The Directive 2006/73/EC implementing the MiFID provides further clarity as to what rules are applicable
to each client category.
20 According to Annex II (II.1) of the MiFID, a retail investor can waive certain protections afforded by the
conduct of business rules if he meets at least two of the following three criteria: (a) the investor has carried
out transactions, in significant size, on the relevant market at an average frequency of 10 per quarter over the
previous four quarters; (b) the size of the investor’s financial instrument portfolio, defined as including cash
deposits and financial instruments exceeds 500,000€; (c) the investor works or has worked in the financial
sector for at least 1 year in a professional position, which requires knowledge of the transactions or services
envisaged.
21 On the implementation of the ISD I in the EU Member States in general, see, e.g., Tison 2002.
22 See, in particular, art. 4 of the Commission Directive 2006/73/EC implementing the MiFID: “Member
States may retain or impose requirements additional to those in Directive 2006/73/EC in exceptional cases
where such requirements are objectively justified and proportionate so as to address specific risks to investor
protection or to market integrity that are not adequately addressed by the Directive and provided that the
specific risks addressed by the requirements are of particular importance in the circumstances of the market
structure of that Member State.” Notwithstanding the “exceptional” impact of the recent financial crisis, this
provision was hardly used by the Member States to impose requirements additional to those in the MiFID
and the Implementing Directive, to a large extent due to the difficulties involved in justifying such measures
before the Commission.
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the result of political compromises between Member States, the latter may provide for
neither more nor less protective conduct of business rules.
The current policy reflected in the MiFID is based on the assumption that retail
investors in the EU deserve the same level of protection all over the EU, and that the
EC conduct of business rules fit to the needs of retail investors in each Member State.
One may doubt, however, to what extent the maximum harmonization approach is
consistent with the idea of the empowerment of investors to make active use of their
rights, considering that the economic, social and cultural needs of non-professional
investors may differ from one Member State to another. One of the most important
questions that should be asked is whether the needs of non-professional investors in
countries with highly developed capital markets, such as the UK, are the same as the
needs of non-professional investors in post-communist countries with largely
underdeveloped capital markets, such as Romania. In so far, the export of the
Western type of the EC securities regulation to the New Member States has not been
studied in the context of the economic, social and local needs of these countries
(Cherednychenko 2010).
Conduct of Business Rules as Supervision Standards
Although the MiFID contains mandatory contract-related rules for the conduct of
business by investment service providers, it is notable that these rules are not written
for and from the perspective of the private law relationship between the investment firm
or credit institution and the (retail) investor (Micklitz 2004, p. 324). In contrast, for
example, to the Draft Directive on Consumer Rights which explicitly confers rights on
consumers against businesses and, albeit to a limited extent, provides consumers with
remedies,23 the MiFID is not drafted in such terms. The MiFID does not explicitly grant
rights to retail investors as regards conduct of business rules or contain remedies
empowering such investors to take action in those cases where an investment firm or a
credit institution does not comply with the conduct of business rules.24 In this respect, the
MiFID also differs from the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services
Directive applicable inter alia to distance selling of consumer investment services, and
more recent sector-specific directives related to the provision of other (consumer)
financial services, such as the Payment Services Directive25 and the Consumer Credit
Directive.26 Unlike the MiFID, the contract-related rules in these three measures are
drafted from the perspective of the private law relationship between a consumer and a
service provider and do include inter alia consumer rights;27 moreover, the Payment
23 E.g., the consumer’s right of withdrawal for distance and off-premises contracts (ch. III), consumer rights
specific to sales contracts (ch. IV), consumer rights concerning contract terms (ch. V).
24 The only provisions of the MiFID which deal with private enforcement—arts. 52(2b) and 53—are
discussed in more detail below.
25 Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment
services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and
repealing Directive 97/5/EC, OJ L 319/1.
26 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, OJ L 133/66.
27 E.g., the consumer’s right of withdrawal (art. 6 of the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services
Directive; art. 14 of the Consumer Credit Directive); the consumer’s right to early repayment (art. 16 of the
Consumer Credit Directive); the payer’s right to a refund for payment transactions initiated by or through a
payee (art. 62 of the Payment Services Directive).
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Services Directive, for example, also extensively deals with service provider liabilities to
consumers.28
As a matter of fact, both the ISD and the MiFID are drafted predominantly from the
perspective of public enforcement of the investor protection provisions contained therein
via supervisory authorities (Grundmann-van de Krol 2002, p. 4; Micklitz 2004, p. 324).
The extensive conduct of business regime established by the MiFID is directed at ensuring
the effective supervision over the compliance by investment service providers with the new
supervision standards. The provider which does not comply with the conduct of business
rules must be subject to administrative sanctions which must be effective, proportionate and
dissuasive (art. 51 of the MiFID). To ensure the effective administrative enforcement of the
MiFID, Member States should establish public authorities (art. 48(2) of the MiFID).
Imposing supervision standards upon investment service providers and ensuring their
public enforcement have currently been seen by the EU legislator as the primary means of
achieving its regulatory objectives in the field of investment services and activities,
including a high level of investor protection.
Against this background, it is not surprising that the MiFID, including the extensive
contract-related conduct of business rules contained therein, was implemented by Member
States not within the civil codes or consumer protection legislation but within the financial
supervision legislation. As a result, the conduct of business rules as supervision standards
whose compliance must be checked by supervisory authorities are generally considered to
be of a public law nature (e.g., Van Baalen 2007, p. 661; Ferrarini 2005, p. 21; Fuchs 2009,
p. 1194; Grundmann-van de Krol 2002, p. 2; Koller 2009, p. 1254; Köndgen 1998, p. 117;
Micklitz 2004, p. 324).
The Implications of the MiFID Conduct of Business Regime for Retail Investor
Empowerment
Direct/Indirect Effect
The purport of the MiFID conduct of business regime gives cause for reflection concerning
the empowerment of individual non-professional investors to stand up for their rights.
Considering that conduct of business rules are standards of financial supervision, the first
question which needs to be answered is whether these rules have any effect in the private
law relationship between the investment firm or credit institution and the (potential) client.
Can the investor invoke the conduct of business rules directly?29 Or does he have to ground
his claim in the existing private law causes of action, and if so, to what extent do the
conduct of business rules help him in doing so? In the absence of clear guidelines
concerning the private enforcement of the EC securities regulation by the aggrieved
investors or their groups, in particular remedies available to them, Member States have a
wide discretion as to how to deal with it. It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that there
28 E.g., the payment service provider’s liability to the payer for unauthorized payment transactions (art. 60);
the payment services provider’s liability to the payer for non-execution or defective execution of the payment
transaction (art. 75).
29 Such an approach has been advocated, for example, by Reich who argues that although the MiFID
conduct of business rules are predominantly of a public law nature, they may nevertheless be interpreted in
the sense that they also confer subjective rights on individual investors vis-à-vis investment service
providers (Reich 2010b).
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are differences between Member States concerning the effect of the conduct of business
rules as between the investment service provider and its (potential) client.
First of all, legal systems approach differently the issue of whether supervision standards
may have direct effect in private law. In the UK, for example, the supervision standards can
be directly invoked by private parties who have suffered loss as a result of their breach by
the investment firm or credit institution. This has become possible because the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 makes frequent use of the technique of expressly conferring
a statutory right of action upon designated persons pursuant to Section 150 of the Act where
loss has been suffered as a result of a breach of duty under the Act or delegated legislation
or other rules made under its aegis. The Financial Services Authority has decided that a
right of action would be available to a private person in respect of any rule within the
Conduct of Business Source Book.30 In contrast, in many other legal systems, in particular,
in Germany and the Netherlands, conduct of business rules do not have direct effect
between the investment service provider and its (potential) client, and hence they cannot be
directly invoked by the aggrieved retail investor.
Secondly, it seems to be undisputed today that the regulatory conduct of business rules
may have indirect effect between the investment service provider and its (potential) client.
In many legal systems, the conduct of business rules have already been exercising a
radiating effect (Ausstrahlungsswirkung) on the content of the private law concepts.31 In
German law, for example, the conduct of business rules contained in the Securities Trading
Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG)) 1994 specify the meaning of more general private
law concepts, such as good faith (Treu und Glauben) contained in Section 242 of the Civil
Code, the commission agent’s duty of loyalty (Pflicht zur Interessenwahrung) laid down in
Section 348 of the Commercial Code or pre-contractual duties which can be based on
Section 311(2) of the Civil Code.32 In Dutch law, the private law concepts, such as the
service provider’s general duty of care (zorgplicht van een goed opdrachtnemer) embodied
in article 7:401 of the Civil Code, serve as an umbrella under which the conduct of business
rules laid down in or pursuant to the Financial Supervision Act (Wet financieel toezicht
(Wft)) 2007 enter into contract law.33 Also in English law the conduct of business rules,
which are now contained in the Conduct of Business Sourcebook enacted by the Financial
Services Authority,34 have become highly influential in shaping the common law standards
of care, in particular the scope of the duty of care in the tort of negligence.35
30 FSA PS 45, para. 3.47.
31 On this in more detail, see Cherednychenko 2007, Chapters 7 and 8.
32 See, for example, BGH 11 November 2003, WM 2004, 24, 26; BGH 8 May 2001, 22, ZIP 2001, 1580,
1581; BGH 5 October 1999, BGHZ 142, 345, 346.
33 See, in particular, the case law of the alternative dispute resolution boards in the field of financial
services—the Dutch Securities Institute Complaints Board (Klachtencommissie DSI (KCD)) and the
Appeal Commission of the Dutch Securities Institute (Commissie van Beroep (KHCB)), as well as their
successor—the Financial Services Disputes Board (Geschillencommissie financiële dienstverlening) of the
Financial Services Complaints Institute (Klachteninstituut Financiële Dienstverlening (Kifid)). E.g.
KHCB 30 July 2002, JOR 2002/165; KCD 30 July 2003, no. 107; KCD 16 December 2005, 05–282.
34 The FSA has extensive statutory powers to make rules under the Financial Services and Markets Act
(FSMA) 2000 (ss. 138–148).
35 See, for example, Lloyd Cheyham & Co. Ltd v. Eversheds [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. P.N. 154; Bankers Trust
International PLC v. PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera [1996] CLC 518; Gorham & Others v. British
Telecommunications plc, Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme, & Standard Life Assurance Company [2000] 1
WLR 2129; Brandeis (Brokers) Ltd v. Black and others [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 980; Loosemore v.
Financial Concepts (a firm) [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. P.N. 235; Seymour v. Caroline Ockwell & Co [2005] 39 P.
N.L.R. 758.
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However, there are considerable differences between Member States concerning the
conditions under which supervision standards may have indirect effect in the investment
service provider–client relationship. The answer to this question largely depends on
national private laws. In order to have indirect effect, supervision standards should always
fit in the private law concepts.
In English law, for example, a supervision standard will have a radiating effect in
common law only if the claimant succeeds in establishing that a duty of care corresponding
to the supervision standard should be recognized at common law.36
In the Netherlands, the effect of supervision standards in private law is in the first place
subject to the “relativity,” or “proximity,” requirement laid down in art. 6:163 of the Civil
Code. According to this requirement, the violation of a legal rule will only lead to liability
towards persons alleging damages as a consequence of this violation if the said rule is
intended to protect their interests.37 The relativity plays a decisive role in determining
whether the violation of a certain supervision standard contained in the Financial
Supervision Act 2007 has effect in the investment service provider–client relationship via
general private law concepts, such as the general duty of care in tort or contract embodied
in arts. 6:162 and 7:401 of the Civil Code, respectively.38 For example, the rules laid down
in or pursuant to Part IV of the Act, which implement art. 19 of the MiFID concerning the
investment service providers’ conduct of business obligations, clearly aim to protect
investors and hence they have effect in private law. The “relativity”-test, however, does not
always lead to a clear-cut outcome. This is in particular the case with certain rules
concerning the management of an investment firm contained in the Further Regulations on
Conduct Supervision of Financial Firms (Nadere regeling gedragstoezicht financiële
ondernemingen) 2006 (Supplement 9) currently in force because such rules may have the
elements of both prudential and conduct supervision (Van Baalen 2007, p. 666). It is
unclear, for instance, whether the rules concerning the client order handling and records
have effect in private law (Supplement 9, art. 9.15 of the Further Regulations).
A similar requirement of relativity also exists in German tort law under Section 823 of
the German Civil Code. In order to base the liability of the investment service provider in
tort, the (potential) client must prove that the supervision rule contained in the Securities
Trading Act, which allegedly has been breached, not only serves the general interest, but
also his individual interest. It is notable, however, that contrary to the prevailing view in the
literature,39 in its recent case law, the German Supreme Court in private law matters appears
to be reluctant to give effect to the conduct of business rules contained in the Securities
Trading Act on the basis of Section 823 of the Civil Code. In one of the cases decide by it,
the facts of which relate to the conduct of business rules as laid down Section 31ff. of the
Act prior to the implementation of the MiFID, the Supreme Court did recognize the
investor protection function of these rules; nonetheless, it denied that the conduct of
business rules can be qualified as the rules protecting the investors’ individual interests in
the sense of Section 823 of the Civil Code.40 According to the Court, individual claims for
36 See, for example, Loosemore v. Financial Concepts (a firm) [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. P.N. 235; Seymour v.
Caroline Ockwell & Co [2005] 39 P.N.L.R. 758. See also Michael Martin & Another v. Britannia Life
Limited [2000] Lloyd’s Rep. P.N. 412.
37 See the Explanation in Parlementaire Geschiedenis Boek 6, p. 615.
38 Although the concept of relativity is best known in tort law, in Dutch private law it is also highly relevant
for the effect of the public law norms in contractual relationships.
39 See Fuchs 2009, p. 1206, with further references to the extensive literature.
40 BGH 19 February 2008, BKR 2008, 294.
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damages as a result of the violation of the conduct of business rules do not make sense and
are unacceptable considering the whole system of liability.41
At the same time, such a restrictive approach of the German Supreme Court to liability
in tort on the basis of Section 823 of the Civil Code, does not seem to preclude the
aggrieved (potential) client from invoking other private law concepts as the legal basis for
the investment firm’s or credit institution’s liability for the violation of the conduct of
business rules in the investment service provider–client relationship. In particular, the
conduct of business rules may have a radiating effect upon the content of Section 311(2)
which may provide the basis for pre-contractual duties, Section 280(1) of the Civil Code
concerning the violation of a contractual duty or § 826 of the Civil Code concerning
intentionally causing damage in a manner violating good morals (Fuchs 2009).
Procedural Difficulties to Retail Investors
Furthermore, even if a particular supervision standard may, whether directly or indirectly,
have effect in the relationship of investment service provider and its client, this does not
imply yet that the aggrieved retail investor has a real chance to obtain relief. Whether the
retail investor can reasonably expect to successfully sue an investment firm or a credit
institution over its failure to observe a supervision standard will largely depend on how
accessible private litigation against such parties in terms of time and costs involved therein
is, both domestically and on a cross-border basis, and on how easy it is to obtain relief
through the applicable contract or tort law.
As far as retail investors’ access to justice is concerned, collective actions and alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms have a particular role to play here. It is notable that
the majority of the Member States currently does not provide for collective redress tools at
all.42 Across those 13 Member States which do have mechanisms to deal with mass
investor claims, these mechanisms differ considerably in relation to their scope, legal
standing, opt-in/opt-out, funding and distribution of proceeds.
In Germany, for example, next to a representative action of a more general character
under the Legal Services Act (Rechtsberatungsgesetz (RDG)) 2008, where consumers can
assign their claims to a consumer association which would bring the cases to court, there is
also a specific mechanism for mass investor claims under the Capital Market Model Claims
Act (Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz (KapMuG)) 2005. The latter was designed as
a test case procedure43 to strengthen the position of investors in certain disputes under
capital markets law. The procedure applies inter alia to multiple investor claims for
compensation of damages due to false, misleading or omitted public capital information.
Questions of fact and points of law which are the same in at least 10 individual lawsuits for
41 BGH 19 February 2008, BKR 2008, 294, 295.
42 Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the UK. See European Commission-DG SANCO, Study on the Evaluation of the Effectiveness
and the Efficiency of Collective Redress Mechanisms in the European Union, 26 August 2008 (referred to
below as Evaluation Study Collective Redress), p. 6, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/
collective_redress_en.htm#Studies.
43 After a trial period of 5 years, the Capital Market Model Claims Act will automatically expire on
November 1, 2010. If it is found to work adequately, the legislator may decide to extend it or even
incorporate its rules into the Code of Civil Procedure. In the latter case, model case proceedings would
become generally available in civil litigation. Current comments are positive and demonstrate a tendency
towards the extension of the Act. See Country Report Germany in Evaluation Study Collective Redress, Part
II (Country Reports), p. 6.
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damages are to be combined in model proceedings and decided on a uniform basis by a
higher regional court with binding effect for all plaintiffs.
Unlike Germany, the Netherlands, for example, has no specific procedure for bringing
mass investor claims. Retail investors may, however, resort to the general procedures for
collective redress. Under Dutch law, a foundation or an association representing other
persons with the same interest can initiate a collective action in order to obtain a declaratory
judgment; damages cannot be awarded in this procedure (art. 3:305 of the Dutch Civil
Code). In addition, with the adoption of the Collective Settlement of Mass Damages Act
2005, a collective settlement negotiated between a foundation or an association and the
liable party for the payment of damages to be made to all the aggrieved parties can be
declared binding on both the liable party and the aggrieved parties by the court, unless they
opt-out (art. 7:907of the Dutch Civil Code). According to the study launched by the
European Commission into the effectiveness and the efficiency of collective redress
mechanisms in the EU, the existing schemes of collective redress generally produce mixed
results: while some elements of such schemes work, other do not.44
The modalities of the ADR mechanisms, such as ombudsmen, mediators, or complaint
boards, also vary considerably across the EU. Some Member States have rather well-
developed informal dispute resolution bodies, operating as an alternative to private law
courts, for disputes related to all financial services sectors, including investment services.
The Financial Ombudsman Service in the UK and the Financial Services Complaints
Institute (Klachteninstituut Financiële Dienstverlening (Kifid)) in the Netherlands are the
examples of such ADR bodies. The existing ADR mechanisms in the investment services
sector differ in terms of their character (whether obligatory for investment service providers
or not) and procedures.45 In a number of Member States, however, ADR schemes in the
area of investment services sector are still either non-existent or relatively underdeveloped.
This is generally the case, for example, in the new Member States. Moreover, very few
Member States have developed collective out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms.46
The need for improving access to justice for consumers, both through the development
of collective redress and ADR mechanisms, has been acknowledged on the EU level. In the
2008 Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress the Commission initiated the
assessment of the current state of redress mechanisms with a view to closing any gaps to
effective redress identified in such cases.47 In its 2009 follow-up consultation paper the
Commission contends that “the lack of an effective legal framework enabling consumers to
ensure adequate compensation in mass claim cases is detrimental to the market and creates
a justice gap.”48 The available policy options described by the Commission range from
taking no action in this area to establishing a detailed harmonized EU-wide judicial
collective redress mechanism including collective ADR. It remains to be seen which option
will ultimately be chosen. At present, however, the only relevant rule in the EC law on
collective actions in the investment services field is art. 52(2b) of the MiFID which
44 Evaluation Study Collective Redress, p. 47 and part II (country reports).
45 See European Commission Consultation Document on Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Area of
Financial Services, Brussels, referred to below as Commission Consultation Document ADR Financial
Services, 11 December 2008, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/adr/adr_
consultation_en.pdf. See also DG SANCO, Study on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the
European Union, 16 October 2009, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_study.pdf.
46 See Evaluation Study Collective Redress.
47 Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM (2008) 794 final.
48 Follow-up to the Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, 8 May 2009, p. 3, available at http://ec.
europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm#Consultation.
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provides for “a right of appeal” by consumer organizations to “ensure that the national
provisions for the implementation of this Directive are applied.” Unfortunately, this
provision does not define the specific scope and objective of this right.
The improvement of the ADR mechanisms, specifically in the field of financial services,
have currently also focused the attention of the EU institutions. In its 2008 resolution on the
Green Paper on retail financial services49 the European Parliament requested that consumers
have access to ADR mechanisms, both at national and cross-border level, and called on the
Commission to promote best practices on ADR. In the same year the Commission started a
consultation process with a view to improving the effectiveness of national ADR schemes,
and hence that of a pan-European financial dispute resolution network of national out-of-
court complaint schemes established already in 2001—a FIN-NET.50 While stakeholders are
generally of the view that there is a need to look for ways to improve the possibilities for
redress through ADR schemes, opinions differ as to how this can be achieved and at what
level (national/EU).51 It is also not clear yet what policy options will be pursued by the
Commission in this field. It is notable, however, that the foundation of a pan-EU dispute
resolution system is already laid down in a public enforcement-oriented MiFID. Art. 53 of
this Directive obliges the Member States to “encourage the setting-up of efficient and
effective complaints and redress procedures for the out-of-court settlement of consumer
disputes concerning the provision of investment and ancillary services provided by
investment firms, using existing bodies where appropriate.”
As has already been mentioned above, apart from the problem of access to justice, another
major issue for a retail investor is how easy he can obtain relief trough the applicable contract
or tort law. Even if a particular supervision standard has effect in the relationship of
investment service provider and its client, this does not mean yet that the latter will obtain
relief. In order to do so, all conditions for liability, rescission or termination of the contract,
under the applicable national private law, should be met.
For a successful claim for damages in Dutch contract law, for example, it is not only
necessary to establish that there is a violation of a particular supervision standard and that this
violation involves the breach of the investment service provider’s general duty of care under
art. 7:401 of the Civil Code amounting to non-performance (tekortkoming) in the sense of art.
6:74 of the Civil Code. In addition, art. 6:74 requires that the non-performance is imputable to
the service provider, that the client has suffered loss and that there is a causal link between the
breach of the general duty of care by the service provider and the loss suffered by the client.
As a rule, the burden of proof with regard to all these conditions lies with the aggrieved
retail investor. In practice, however, it may not always be easy for the investor to prove
them. Particular difficulties may arise concerning the proof of the causal link between the
breach of the conduct of business rules and the damage. Proof of a causal link may be
difficult, for example, if the investor has suffered loss due to unclear or misleading
information, a missing warning of the risks involved in a certain investment or a
recommendation to purchase an unsuitable investment product. More investor friendly
private law courts in some legal systems tend, therefore, to reverse the burden of proof in
certain cases in favour of investors. Thus, for example, in its recent judgment, the German
49 European Parliament resolution of 5 June 2008 on the Green Paper on Retail Financial Services in the
Single Market (2007/2287(INI)).
50 Commission Consultation Document ADR Financial Services.
51 European Commission, Summary of the Responses to the Public Consultation on Alternative Dispute
Resolution in the Area of Financial Services, Brussels, 14 September 2009, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/redress/consultation_summary_en.pdf.
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Supreme Court in private law matters adopted a presumption that the aggrieved individual
investor would not have made an investment if the investment adviser had provided him
with the correct information concerning his kick-back-payments; as a rule, this presumption
applies to all cases in which the investment adviser has failed to comply with its duties to
inform.52 Accordingly, if the violation of the duty to inform by the investment adviser is
established, it is up to the adviser to prove that the investor would have concluded the
contract even he was duly informed. Reich has recently argued in favour of extending such
reverse burden of proof to the (sufficiently) serious violations of the investment service
providers’ obligations under the MiFID (Reich 2010b).
While it aims to protect investors, the MiFID itself, however, does not contain any rules
which would (seek to) improve the retail investor’s procedural position by reversing the
burden of proof in his favour. It is notable that in contrast to the MiFID, such rules can be
found in other directives in the area of financial services.
Thus, for example, according to art. 7(3) of the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial
Services Directive, in those cases where the consumer exercises his right of withdrawal from a
distance contract, the supplier may not require the consumer to pay any amount for the service
actually provided by the supplier, unless he can prove that the consumer was duly informed
about the amount payable. Article 15 of this Directive provides that Member States may also
shift the burden of proof to the supplier in respect of other supplier’s obligations to inform the
consumer set out in this Directive, the consumer’s consent to conclusion of the contract, and,
where appropriate, its performance. A similar rule can be found in art. 33 of the Payment
Services Directive. According to this provision, Member States may stipulate that the burden
of proof concerning the compliance with the information requirements laid down in this
Directive shall lie with the payment service provider. Moreover, a number of consumer
protection rules on burden of proof, which do not allow any discretion for the Member States,
are also included in the Draft Directive on Consumer Rights.53
As the MiFID, however, does not contain any such rules, it wholly depends on national
private laws whether an individual investor’s claim arising from the violation of a
supervision standard will attract a reverse burden of proof.
What About Investor Duties and the (Shared) Liability Regime?
Last but not least, consumer rights and consumer responsibilities must go hand-in-hand. In
order to benefit from their rights, consumers should normally fulfil certain duties. In the
first place, they should comply with certain information and notification obligations to be
able to enforce their rights. Moreover, consumers are also expected to make efforts in order
to make responsible choices.
Consumer duties are also not something new for EC law. Such duties are contained, for
example, in the Draft Directive on Consumer Rights.54 Similarly, the Payment Services
Directive also imposes certain obligations on consumers in relation to payment instruments.
For example, according to art. 56(b) of this Directive, the payment service user should
notify the payment service provider without any delay on becoming aware of loss, theft or
misappropriation of the payment instrument, or of its unauthorized use. Moreover, as has
already been mentioned above, the Payment Services Directive, to a certain extent, also
52 BGH, 12 May 2009, WM 2009, 1274.
53 E.g., terms presumed to be unfair (art. 35); burden of proof in case of the lack of conformity (Art. 28).
54 E.g., the consumer’s duty to inform the seller in case of the lack of conformity (art. 28 (4)); the obligations
of the consumer in case of withdrawal (art. 17).
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harmonizes the liability regime.55 This Directive even contains a provision on payer’s
liability: under art. 61(1) of the Directive the payer shall bear the losses relating to any
unauthorized payment transactions, up to a maximum of 150€, resulting from the use of a
lost or stolen payment instrument or, if the payer has failed to keep the personalized
security features safe, from the misappropriation of a payment instrument.
A characteristic feature of the EC investment services regulation, however, is its strong
focus on the duties of investment service providers and the absence of the liability regime.
The role of the client in the investment service process is hardly dealt with therein. For
example, the MiFID does not explicitly lay down the investor’s duty to study information
provided to him by the investment firm or the duty to provide the investment firm with
correct information regarding his knowledge and experience in the investment field, his
financial situation and his investment objectives. While these duties of the investor
essentially correspond to the obligations of the investment firm to provide the investor with
appropriate information under art. 19(3) and to assess the suitability of a particular
investment service or financial instrument under art. 19(4) of the MiFID, respectively, the
Directive does not address the issue of the legal consequences of a failure to observe his
own duties for the investor.
Such an approach may give an impression that the violation of a particular supervision
standard in the investment service provider–client relationship will always lead to the full
liability of an investment firm or a credit institution provided that the conditions of such
liability are met. Yet, in many legal systems, the (potential) client may be held partially
liable for his loss.
This is the case, for example, in Dutch law where the core principal of tort law,
according to which everybody has to bear his damage, is considerably restricted as a result
of introducing the shared liability of banks and their clients for compliance with the
applicable rules, including those which form part of the financial supervision legislation.
This follows, for instance, from the decision of the Dutch Supreme Court in the
Kouwenberg v. Rabobank case.56 According to the Supreme Court, even if the bank
violates its duty of care towards the client by yielding to the client’s explicit wish to execute
his order despite a lack of sufficient securities, the client may be held liable for a part of the
losses if they were caused by his own fault (eigen schuld); this may be the case if the client
was aware of the fact that his transactions in options57 did not comply with the margin
requirements,58 but nevertheless failed to close out his positions and to refrain from
entering into new transactions. Recently, the Supreme Court also imposed shared liability
on the bank and its client in the De T. v. Dexia Bank Nederland N.V. case.59 In this case, the
retail investor who financed the purchase of financial instruments with borrowed money
suffered substantial losses. It was established that the bank failed to comply with its private
law duty to know its client and to warn him about the risks involved in investing with
borrowed money (effectenlease). Yet, the retail investor was held liable for 40% of his
losses, as, according to the Supreme Court, he had failed to make a reasonable effort to
55 See arts. 60–61 (liability for unauthorized payment transactions) and arts. 74–78 (liability for non-
execution or defective execution of payment transactions).
56 HR 11 July 2003, NJ 2005, 103.
57 Options are financial instruments that convey the right to engage in a future transaction on some
underlying security, such as shares or bonds.
58 Margin requirement is the minimum amount in the form of cash or eligible securities that an investor must
deposit in a margin account before buying or selling positions in options.
59 HR 5 June 2009, RvdW 2009, 683. See also HR 5 June 2009, RvdW 2009, 684 (Levob Bank N.V. v. B,
and GBD).
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understand the meaning of effectenlease, while the risks involved therein were made
sufficiently clear in the contract concluded by him.
In the absence of clear rules on investor duties and liabilities, the aggrieved investor who
has succeeded in establishing the violation of a particular conduct of business rule still faces
uncertainty as to his own share of losses. Such a prospect may deter retail investors from
bringing actions against investment service providers. Moreover, the lack of harmonization
in this area may also negatively affect the establishment of the single market in investment
services and products. It is unfortunate, therefore, that in its recent 2010 Communication on
Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth the Commission commits itself to
promoting convergence of sanctions solely across the range of supervisory activities in the
financial sector without even acknowledging the importance of such convergence in the
area of civil liability.60
Towards Investor Empowerment?
It follows from the foregoing that the violation of the conduct of business rules does not eo
ipso lead to the liability in private law. The private law concepts still largely provide the
basis for the investment firm’s or credit institution’s liability for a breach of its duties of
care towards the retail investor, and hence determine whether there is a violation of a duty
of care in private law and, if so, what are the consequences—if any—of such a violation for
the investment service provider and the investor. In some respects, this situation can be
explained by the multi-level system of governance in the EU and the principle of procedural
autonomy of the Member States.61 At the same time, a great deal of uncertainty concerning
the consequences of the violation of the contact-related standards contained in the MiFID in
the investment service provider-client relationship is caused by the supervisory nature of
these rules and their implementation into the public law legislation in the Member States.
This fact makes it much more difficult to grasp whether a particular supervision standard
has effect in private law and, if so, what remedies are available to the (potential) client in
case of its violation by the investment service provider.
The fact that the EU legislator places strong emphasis on public enforcement in the
investment services field is disturbing because private enforcement by individual investors
or their groups is also important for the ability of the EC securities regulation to attain its
policy goals.62 As Moloney observes (Moloney 2007, p. 425):
“Market mechanisms which promote good behaviour by investment firms depend, in
part, on the active policing by investors of firm failures, particularly with respect to
investment advice. The development of an effective retail investor constituency
includes, therefore, the development of a cohort of investors empowered, and
sufficiently informed, to monitor investment firms (...) and to exercise liability rights,
whether contractual or otherwise.”
Besides, it remains to be seen whether and, if so, to what extent, supervisory authorities,
which are primarily concerned with protecting the general interest, will play a role in
60 Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the European Central Bank on Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth, COM
(2010) 301 final, p. 6.
61 See, in particular, a study by Reich into the relationship between rights and obligations of private parties in
EU law: Reich 2010a, b.
62 On the importance of an effective retail investor enforcement in Europe see, e.g., Black 2001; Coffee
2004; Moloney 2007.
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protecting the individual investor interests. It is the combination of public and private
enforcement which is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the legal standard in
practice.63 At the moment, the private enforcement of the EC securities regulation,
however, heavily depends on national private laws. It is not entirely clear therefore to what
extent aggrieved investors will really benefit from the extensive conduct of business rules
introduced by the EC securities regulation, and thus to what extent the latter will be able to
ensure a high level of investor protection.
As the European Commission itself acknowledges, good investor protection rules
do not guarantee good investment decisions.64 The existence of such rules alone is not
sufficient to secure a high level of investor protection; legal rules should be
supplemented by other measures, such as retail investor education and the promotion
of retail investor governance.65 The need for such measures, however, does not replace
the need for the establishment of a comprehensive legal framework which would
provide retail investors with both rights and remedies vis-à-vis investment service
providers.
The Role of Private Law in Protecting Retail Investors
A Two-Tier Legal Framework
In fact, the conduct of business rules, which now form part of the EC regulatory
framework for investment services, have largely originated within the national private
laws, in particular contract laws of the Member States, and, primarily with a view to
strengthening investors’ confidence in the financial market, have been casted as
supervision standards and strengthened by public law enforcement mechanisms in the
financial supervision legislation.66 Thus, for example, the provider’s duty to know one’s
client when providing investment advice, which is now included in art. 19(4) of the
MiFID, largely corresponds to the rules earlier established in the Bond case decided by
the German Supreme Court in private law matters (Bundesgerichtshof) in 1993.67 What
implications, however, does the publicization of the private law duties of care have for the
role of private law, in particular purely private law duties of care, in protecting non-
professional investors today? May the latter still rely on the investment service providers’
duties of care in private law?68
It is notable that at the time of drafting the MiFID, the Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament justified one of its amendments to the
MiFID by the need to prevent investment service providers from being subject to a
63 For well-articulated arguments in favour of such an approach in the law and economic literature, see, e.g.,
Kolstad et al. 1990; Shavell 1984, 2004. Cf. Rose-Ackerman 1991.
64 Commission Communication on PRIP, p. 5. See also Communication from the Commission to the
Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee on EU Consumer
Policy Strategy 2007–2013: Empowering Consumers, Enhancing Their Welfare, Effectively Protecting,
COM (2007) 99 final.
65 On a “multi-stranded strategy for the retail markets,” see Moloney 2007.
66 On this development in German, Dutch and English Law in more detail, see Cherednychenko 2007, chs. 7
& 8. Cf. Grundmann 2005, p. 490. On a similar development in Belgian law, see Colaert 2010.
67 BGH 6 July 1993, BGHZ 123, 126=NJW 1993, 2433 (Bond).
68 On the role of private law in the investment service provider-client relationship after the introduction of the
(EC) conduct of business rules in more detail, see Cherednychenko 2009.
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“double layer of regulation” in some Member States, such as Germany, where “much
investor protection is carried out via civil liability in the courts.”69 The proposed
amendment was meant to make clear that the “new EU framework supersedes traditional
pre-existing civil liability,”70 so that the private law rules may not undermine the new
supervision standards.71
It is highly doubtful, however, whether any significant importance can be attached to
these remarks, considering that the MiFID itself is silent upon the issue of the
relationship between the regulatory standards contained therein and national private
laws. Considering that the MiFID is drafted from the perspective of ensuring effective
supervision over the investment services industry, it does not seem plausible to assume
that conduct of business rules are lex specialis as against general private law rules, in the
same way as are, for example, consumer protection provisions. The nature of the conduct
of business rules makes it possible to conclude that private law duties of care have not
been overruled by the public law duties of care contained in the supervision legislation.
Accordingly, by casting many rules which are relevant for the private law relationship
between the investment service provider and the retail client, the EU legislator created a
two-tier legal framework, consisting of private law, on the one hand, and public law, on
the other.
The Relationship between Supervision Standards and Private Law Rules
The emergence of the two-tier legal framework for the provision of investment services
gives rise to the question of how the two sets of substantive rules relate and should relate to
each other.72 The crucial issue here is to what extent private law can maintain and develop
purely private law rules, in particular, duties of care, independently from the conduct of
business rules, considering the latter’s maximum harmonization under the MiFID.
This issue is not of a purely theoretical interest, as by no means all private law duties of
care currently in force in the Member States correspond to the new supervision standards
implementing the MiFID. Thus, for example, the requirement established by the German
Supreme Court in the Bond case that in providing investment advice the bank must also
cover the specific risks involved in the recommended financial instruments73 exceeds the
bank’s conduct of business obligations under arts. 19(3) and (4) of the MiFID.74 Similarly,
the Dutch private law courts hold investment firms and credit institutions under the broad
duty to know their client in those cases where complex and risky investment products or
70 Ibid.
71 While the rationale for the amendment was to clarify the relationship between the contract-related
supervision standards contained in the MiFID and national private laws in general, the proposed amendment
though was made only in the context of the MiFID provision on client classification and merely contained
suggestions as to the clearer definitions of “professional client” and “retail client.” These suggestions were
included in the final text of the MiFID.
72 On the relationship between supervision standards and private law in more detail, see Cherednychenko 2009.
73 BGH 6 July 1993, BGHZ 123 (Bond).
74 Under art. 19(3) and (4) of the MiFID, investment service providers are free from any obligation to
provide information on specific risks associated with investment in particular financial instruments. Cf.
Mülbert 2007, p. 317.
69 Report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament of 4
September 2003 on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on investment services
and regulated market, and amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC, Council Directive 93/6/EEC and
European Parliament and Council 2000/12/EC (COM (2002) 625–C5-0586/2002–2002/0269(COD)),
amendment no. 23.
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services are involved, without distinguishing between different types of investment services
(execution-only, investment advice or portfolio management).75 In all such cases
investment service providers are obliged to collect information, in particular, about the
client’s financial situation and investment objectives.76 Consequently, contrary to art. 19(5)
of the MiFID, which does not impose such an extensive duty to know one’s client on
investment firms and credit institutions providing execution-only services,77 the investment
firm or credit institution providing such service may nonetheless find itself bound by it ex
post under Dutch private law.
As a result of the silence of the MiFID upon the issue of the relationship between the
regulatory standards contained therein and national private laws, and the MiFID’s focus
upon ensuring effective supervision over the investment services industry, the issue in
question has largely been left to national private law courts and alternative dispute
resolution boards in the financial services field (if such are in place) to decide.
At present, the judicial authority on the issue of the relationship between supervision
standards and private law rules is scarce. The dicta available so far in the UK and the
Netherlands, for example, acknowledge the impact of the supervision standards upon the
private law concepts, but at the same time emphasize the autonomy of private law and
private law adjudication in relation to these standards.
Thus, in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Gorham v. British Telecommunications
plc,78 Lord Justice Pill, with whom the other two judges agreed on this point, rejected a
submission by the applicant, Mr Plamer, that the detailed statutory scheme for investor
protection created by the Financial Services Act 1986—the forerunner of the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 currently in force—precluded the court from
developing a common law tortious claim that went beyond the statutory code. As Lord
Justice Pill put it:
“Mr Plamer rightly accepts the pressing need which developed in the 1980s for a
statutory framework within which financial services could be provided. I do not
however discern a Parliamentary intention to eliminate the power of courts to decide
whether a duty of care arises in a particular situation and, if so, what its extent is. Had
Parliament not intervened, remedies for the abuses which existed in this field would
almost certainly have been developed by the courts. The courts now do so in the
context, and with the benefit of, rules and codes of practice laid down by those
concerned with the maintenance of proper standards. The courts can be expected to
75 The most limited type of investment services consists of the supply of execution-only investment services.
Such services consist only of the execution and/or reception and transmission of client orders by a firm or a
credit institution upon the specific instructions of a client, with or without ancillary services. The
involvement of an investment firm or a credit institution goes further if investment services are provided on
the basis of the advisory relationship between the parties. In such a case, an investment service is not limited
to the execution and/or reception and transmission of the client’s orders, but also includes the provision of
investment advice. On the basis of such advice the client makes an investment decision. The most extensive
type of investment services is discretionary management of the client’s portfolio. In such a case, one can
speak about a portfolio-management relationship between the parties, in which the investor entrusts the
investment service provider with the management of his assets or a part thereof.
76 See, for example, District Court of Den Bosch, 9 May 2006, LJN: AX2464.
77 Under art. 19(5) of the MiFID, when providing investment services in complex financial instruments on
the execution-only basis, investment firms or credit institutions should only ask the client to provide
information about his knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of
product or service offered or demanded (the so-called ‘appropriateness test).
78 Gorham & Others v. British Telecommunications plc, Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme, & Standard Life
Assurance Company [2000] 1 WLR 2129.
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attach considerable weight to the content of codes drafted in these circumstances but
are not excluded from making their own assessment of a situation.”79
The message from the Court of Appeal is thus that the conduct of business rules are to
assist the courts in determining what are appropriate standards of care in negligence actions;
at the same time, these rules do not extend to limiting the courts’ ability to develop
principles as to whom the duty of care is owed, something which the courts are perfectly
capable of doing on a purely common law basis.
A similar view has also recently been taken by the Dutch Supreme Court in the cases,
De T. v. Dexia Bank Nederland N.V., Levob Bank N.V. v. B, and GBD and Stichting
Gedupeerden Spaarconstructie v. Aegon Nank N.V.80 In these cases, the banks submitted
that at the time the contract between them and their clients was concluded, the duty to know
one’s client had not been included in the financial supervision legislation then in force.81
Hence, the banks argued, they could expect that by complying with the public law
standards, they had also been acting in conformity with the duty of care in private law. In
all three cases, this line of reasoning was, however, unequivocally rejected by the Supreme
Court which held that the private law duties of care can go further than the public law
duties of care contained in the conduct of business rules. In doing so, the Supreme Court
followed the opinion of the Advocate General in these cases who argued as follows:
“The argument of the banks referred to above does not take into consideration the fact
that although when determining the scope of the bank’s special duty of care, which
follows from the requirements of good faith, the content of the public law legislation
may be taken into account, it is untenable to claim that this private law duty of care
may not go further than the conduct of business rules contained in the public law
legislation. Adopting such an approach would ignore the fact that the Netherlands has
a system of double duties of care—the public law duties of care and the private law
duties of care (primarily developed by the Supreme Court). The public law
supervision legislation aims to safeguard a diligent, professional and honest conduct
of business by an investment firm (and/or a credit institution) and, to this end, it
contains further rules on the basis of which a supervisory authority can promote these
goals. The requirements of good faith as well as that which can be imposed upon a
good service provider are tailored to an individual case and may entail that a financial
service provider is under a further-reaching duty of care than that following from the
public law legislation in force at that time; this is so because the public law duty of
care influences the private law duty of care but does not determine it.”82
When assessing the implications of these pronouncements in practice, one should take
into account that neither the decision of the English Court of Appeal nor the opinion of the
Advocate General of the Dutch Supreme Court were given in relation to the conduct of
business rules implementing the maximum harmonization regime of the MiFID. While the
decision of the Court of Appeal predates not only the MiFID but also the ISD, the opinion
79 [2000] 1 WLR 2129, 2141.
80 HR 5 June 2009, RvdW 2009, 693, 684 and 685.
81 The Securities Transactions Supervision Decree (Besluit toezicht effectenverkeer) 1995 and the Further
Regulations on Market Conduct Supervision of the Securities Trade (Nadere Regeling gedragstoezicht
effectenverkeer) 1995 and 1999.
82 The Opinion of the Advocate General of 13 February 2009 in Levob Bank N.V. v. B, and GBD, De T. v.
Dexia Bank Nederland N.V., and Stichting Gedupeerden Spaarconstructie v. Aegon Nank N.V., para. 3.21
(translation and italics added).
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of the Advocate General is expressed in the context of the conduct of business rules
implementing the minimum harmonization regime of the ISD.
Yet, in my view, the autonomy of private law and private law adjudication from
supervision standards and decisions of supervisory authorities can also be defended by
similar arguments under the MiFID regime.83 The MiFID, read in conjunction with the
principle of loyalty to the Community laid down in article 10 of the EC Treaty, can hardly
be understood in such a way that the national rules implementing it directly shape the
private law relationship of investment firm or credit institution and its client. As long as
private law plays a role of a mediator of the effect of standardized supervision standards in
this private law relationship, it is questionable indeed whether private law should follow
these standards in each individual case. It is not unthinkable that at times, the logic of the
EU policy driven supervision standards and the logic of the largely unharmonized general
private law may clash. For example, applying the rigid classification of clients into
“professional,” “retail,” and “eligible counterparties” set out in the MiFID and adjusting
the otherwise applicable private law standard of care to the supervision standard
pertaining to the established client category may not necessarily do justice in the
circumstances of the individual case. Hence, it is not excluded that in some cases, private
law courts will review the behaviour of investment firms ex post on the basis of the
general private law duties of care which offer more or less protection to the investor than
the maximum harmonization conduct of business rules contained in the MiFID. Under the
current public enforcement-oriented EC legal regime for investor protection it is
particularly important that private law has the ability to go further in protecting retail
investors than financial supervision law.
Denying private law and private law courts a certain degree of autonomy from
supervision standards and supervisory authorities involves risks, considering that the
effectiveness of the EC legal framework for investment services still needs to be proved
(Moloney 2007). While the EU regulatory strategy for the retail investment market, as
expressed in the MiFID conduct of business regime, aims to produce well informed and
active investors who are able to make autonomous investment choices, the exclusive
character of financial supervision regulation as the retail markets strategy also carries
significant risks given inter alia the largely untried nature of supervision standards and
unpredictable changes in market behaviour. Private law and private litigation have an
important role to play as the last resort to those seeking protection should the regulation
fail. In fact, “every private law case may be seen as a failure of regulation” (Wilhelmsson
2007, p. 11).
Concluding Remarks
The analysis of the MiFID framework for the provision of investment services raises
serious concerns about its ability to empower retail investors to make active use of their
rights. While the MiFID aims to attain a high level of investor protection, which is also an
important prerequisite for attaining other two regulatory objectives—the stability and
efficiency of the financial system and the market integration, an individual retail investor is
pushed into the background in this Directive. Being primarily concerned with the public
83 In this sense in German literature also Fuchs 2009, pp. 1195, 1388, with further references; Koller 2006, p.
840; in Dutch literature also Tjong Tjin Tai and Van den Berg 2009, p. 163. For an alternative view see, in
particular, Mülbert 2007, p. 318.
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enforcement of the investor protection rules and their maximum harmonization, the MiFID
does not sufficiently address the needs of individual retail investors in different EU Member
States. It is highly doubtful, therefore, whether extending the MiFID provisions on conduct
of business rules to all packaged retail investment products proposed by the European
Commission will indeed improve investor rights and restore confidence of retail investors
in the financial markets.
As long as the EC securities regulation predominantly focuses on the supervision over
investment services industry, the extent of retail investor protection and empowerment will
significantly depend on national private laws. In the absence of truly investor-oriented rules
at EC level, national private laws should be able to develop autonomously from the EC
supervision standards in order to retain the potential to discover and address problems
encountered by individual investors when dealing with investment firms.
It would be worthwhile, however, to take the rights of retail investors and their ability to
make use of them more seriously within the EC legal framework for the provision of
investment services. More generally, the role of private law within this legal framework and
the interplay between supervision standards and private law rules deserve much more
attention. Concern for the public enforcement of investor protection rules should not replace
concern for their private enforcement altogether.
One of the issues, which requires further research, is whether it was actually reasonable to
cast the standards highly relevant to investor protection within the investment service
provider-client relationship as supervision standards, placing them outside the private law
system and creating a tension between the two. In this context it may be useful, for example,
to investigate to what extent investment service contracts and the regulatory standards related
thereto would fit into the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR; Study Group on a
European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group) 2009), in
particular the principles of European Law on Service Contracts (PELSC) contained in Book
IV, Part C (Services) of the DCFR (Cherednychenko and Jansen 2008).
The current overhaul of the EC legal framework for the provision of investment services
provides a good opportunity to put an individual retail investor to the forefront and to
improve investor protection, not only in words, but in deeds also.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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